Similar to other workers in industrial settings NFL running backs can choose to provide additional work effort with possible negative health consequences. We find that the most informative measure for running backs is yards gained after contact, which not only increases total rushing yards but also increases injuries that can cause subsequent lost income due to future games missed. We econometrically examine the decisions running backs reveal in trading off injury risk against total yards gained and salary in the short run and how the tradeoff appears in the longer run where career length considerations come into play. Our estimates reveal subtle nonlinearities and interpersonal heterogeneity in risky effort and the associated short and long run injury risk and economic payoffs.
"So I told the guy (special teams coach Jeff Fisher) the first guy that hits me, I'm going down. Ain't gonna be no yards after contact," Chris Carter commenting on having to return kickoffs as a rookie.
Introduction
We often view professional sports players as totally different than workers in other industries such as manufacturing where there is also a job-related risk of bodily harm.
But is there really much of an economic difference where workplace safety is concerned?
Both manufacturing workers and NFL players increase the risk of greater non-fatal injuries by working harder. In addition to lost wages in the short-run following the injuries due to missed work, non-fatal injuries can have downstream consequences of possible lower productivity and a lower pay rate, as well as reduced career length, which further lowers earnings in the long run. Viscusi (2004) is a comprehensive examination of the short-run labor market consequences of non-fatal injuries for industrial workers.
Much less is known empirically about the longer-run consequences of non-fatal industrial injuries. Here we study NFL running backs, who have an endogenous component of their injuries due to risky effort they may take and its importance to their careers and earnings.
Risky Effort and Injuries Among Running Backs in the NFL
We begin with some results from the literature and then build on them with original econometric modeling to set up our approach to the ultimate research objective of how risky effort among NFL running backs affects their immediate and longer-run career success. We are particularly interested in how short-run and longer-run career success and length trade off against each other.
Risky Effort and Its Economic Consequences in the Short-Run
We begin with results from Simmons and Berri (2009) who found that running backs are compensated based on rushing yards (Yds), rather than attempts or yards per attempt. We supplement the pay-rushing yards link with additional research results from Keefer (2019) and Simmons and Berri (2009) , which leads us to begin with the following equation that estimates the compensation of running backs ln($ %& ) = ) % + 0.00069 × 012 %&34 + 5 %& 6 7 + 8 %&
where x controls for other personal and team characteristics. The estimated average rate of return to rushing yards is 0.069%, or an additional 100 rushing yards during the course of a season increases compensation in the subsequent year by 6.9% (Keefer 2019 
with B012 %& B>?@ %& = f,
where k is a vector of other variables affecting rushing yards in a given season. We again use fixed effects estimation to account for all time-invariant determinants of rushing yards, such as talent, size, speed, elusiveness. Because injuries are a function of YAC/Att, we include YAC/Att as a control variable. From equations (8) and (10) 
which is
So, \]^_`a \s%_t`a = TVV %& , and increasing the number of yards after contact per rush increases total rushing yards by the number of attempts. The benefit to additional risk in terms of compensation is then 0.00069 × TVV %& .
2.1.1 Preview to estimating the return to risky effort. In sum, the short-run rate of return to risky effort for an individual NFL running back is
and the average short-run rate of return to running backs' risk taking here is
Allowing injuries to impact rushing yards depending on use the rate of return to additional risk is B ln($ %&P4 ) B:;2< %& = 0.00069 xTVV %& + yf 4 + f j Q TVV %& k %& Rz X{.
Our first research objective, then, is to fill out the details of equations (15) and (16) with econometric estimates, which reveals how the rate of return to risky effort among NFL running backs depends on the number of rushing attempts, the marginal effect of injuries on rushing yards, and the marginal effect of injury risk on injuries.
Career Consequences of Risky Effort
Having modeled the year-to-year economic consequences of risky effort and injuries among NFL running backs we now consider the longer-run effects of a change in risk taking. We now let the number of rushing yards in a given season depend on a player's career effort as manifested in total career rushing yards. Algebraically, this means that 
where m is the vector of other factors. Because fixed effects regression using deviations from the individual means requires strong exogeneity, it is inconsistent here as the error term is correlated with future regressors, CovvU~012 %& − U~012 % , Ç %& − Ç % w ≠ 0;
therefore, our estimates of the effect of career yards from our discussion of the short-run effect of risk are biased. We in turn use first differences to account for individual heterogeneity,
Substituting the definition of career yards, we then have
which simplifies to
OLS estimation of the first-differenced equation in (21) is inconsistent because Cov(012 %&34 , ΔÇ %& ) ≠ 0 so we employ instrumental variables estimation. We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) where ì represents the vector of our instrument, career yards, for a given time period. We use the one-step GMM estimator, as our interest is conducting inference on the regression coefficient for career yards (See Kniesner and Leeth 2004 for another workplace safety application).
So, a one-time change in rushing yards in period 0 will generate a change in career rushing yards in period t of
where 012 Ü ò is the difference in rushing yards in period 0. Given this, the effect on rushing yards in period t of a one-time change in rushing yards in period 0 is
The effect of a one-time increase in risk in period 0 on career yards in period t is then
and the change in rushing yards in period t is
Career consequences.
Rushing yards and career rushing yards may have another long-run impact; they may affect the probability of remaining in the NFL. We define the variable Contract to be a binary variable equal to one if the player has an active contract.
We estimate the effects of rushing yards and career rushing yards on the probability of having an active contract the following season using logistic regression
where õ %&P4 = Pr(U §?V~•V %&P4 = 1). We then use the estimates from (27) to determine the effects of additional risk on the probability of career survival in subsequent years,
is the probability of having an active contract for player i if he had taken additional risk in period t = 0. Thus,
and
with \≥¥µ]^_`a \s%_t`∂ and \]^_`a \s%_t`∂ defined in (25) and (26).
Data
Injury data we use are from Pro Football Reference, who maintains a database beginning in the 2009 season, of team injury reports including games missed by players. Pro
Football Reference yielded career rushing attempts and career rushing yards. Yards gained after initial contact, our measure of risk, YAC/Att, came from Pro Football Focus for the 2009 through 2013 seasons. Finally, we collected the cumulative experience of a running back's team's five starting offensive linemen from the NFL. Thus, our final data set represents five years of running backs, which we limit to players with a positive number of rushing attempts in a given season resulting in 254 players and 628 playeryears. 
Econometric Results
We begin with our short-run econometric results followed by long-run economic consequences estimates. Remember that the main difference is that career effort accumulates and affects outcomes in the long-run so that there are both short-run and long-run tradeoffs of effort and pay that will differ. The estimates also show that players who have been more active in previous seasons are exposed to greater injury risk, and the number of career rushing attempts has a positive impact on the number of games missed due to injury. is negative and highly significant in both regressions as missing a game has a larger impact for players who receive more rushing attempts when healthy. Figure 1 displays the effect of injuries on rushing yards for various levels of rushing attempts per game played, along with the 95% confidence interval, for our full specification. The effect is statistically significant for all values of attempts per game greater than or equal to 0.40.
Short-Run Econometric Results
The effect ranges from about -22.6 for a player with an average of five rushing attempts per game, to -100.9 for players with an average of 23 carries per game played.
Short-run return to risky effort.
We can now calculate the short-run rate of return to risky effort by NFL running backs. First, the average benefit of a one-yard increase in YAC/Att is an increase of 94.3 yards. 
Table 5 presents the simulation results for each parameter, the benefit to additional risk, the cost to additional risk, and the average rate of return. The rate of return is positive in all but 30 of 10,000 simulations. Furthermore, the rate of return is between 4% and 6% in 50% of the simulations. Figure 2 displays 
Given the average number of games played, 14, for a player with only two attempts per game the rate of return is a mere 1.5%. For a player with 10 attempts per game the rate of return is 7.6%. Figures 3-6 display graphs of the rate of return, benefit and cost versus utilization for various numbers of games. The rate of return is negative for players with two or fewer games and is basically zero for three games.
Long-Run Econometric Results
To determine the long-run effect of risk taking we must estimate the effect of contemporaneously gained rushing yards on future performance. yards. The effect of career yards on current rushing yards is about -0.28 in the firstdifferenced OLS model. For our Arellano and Bond (1991) estimations the effect ranges from -0.20 to -0.22; all estimates are significant at the 1% level. For all estimations the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of serial correlation is satisfied, we reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation and fail to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. The estimations also fail to reject the Hansen J-test of overidentification. The results imply that there is a cumulative negative effect on performance, similar to the increased injury risk from greater prior use.
For each 100 rushing yards gained, a running back reduces future rushing yards by 20 to
22.
To illustrate the long-run effect of additional risky effort we present a comparison of two hypothetical running backs in Table 7 . For each player we assume a baseline potential for rushing yards in a given season of 400 (the sample average). We then calculate the number of rushing yards in each time period as well as the career yards. The key is that in each period the full 400 yards is not realized due to the cumulative effect of career rushing yards. The only difference between the two players is that Player B rushes for an additional 72 yards in the initial period, the effect of increasing risky effort. Thus, Table 6 displays the effects of a one-time increase in risk in period 0 on rushing yards and career rushing yards in various time periods. Due to the initial advantage in rushing yards, Player B always has more career rushing yards; however, he simultaneously has fewer rushing yards in every season. By period t = 4 the initial advantage of 72 yards has diminished to a difference of only about 40 career rushing yards. The takeaway is that Player B experiences a 5.0% salary premium in t = 1, since his t = 0 rushing yards are greater due to the additional risk taken. However, Player A experiences a greater salary in all subsequent periods, ranging from 0.3% to 1% annually. 
The results are contained in Table 9 . Due to the initial increase in rushing yards for Player B he has a significantly higher probability of having an active contract in period one. However, Player B has a significantly lower probability of continuing in every period beyond the initial period because he has fewer rushing yards and more career rushing yards in all subsequent periods.
Conclusion
Our research goal has been to summarize quantitatively what are the potential costs and benefits to NFL running backs from additional risky effort both in the short and longer runs. The key issues addressed econometrically include the effects of risky effort on injuries, salary and career length. Our research is the most complete empirical work to date on the avenues for how a running back trades off risky additional effort against salary in the short and long runs.
We find that the most informative measure of risk taking is yards after contact and that the elasticity of injuries with respect to risky effort is 0.8. We find a net financial gain of five percent for a 50 percent increase in risky effort with considerable individual heterogeneity in the return. Current risk taking also affect future performance. Again the marginal effects show substantial heterogeneity across players with the general result that current rushing success increases the likelihood of a runner getting a new contract but that past use (yards) reduces career length at the margin. Wooldridge's (1999) quasi-maximum likelihood approach. Elasticities in square brackets and semi-elasticities in curly brackets, calculated at the means of the independent variables. Poisson DV indicates the Poisson regression using player dummy variables to control for fixed effects. Conditional fixed effects Poisson sample size is smaller due to omitting players with only one year of data, 83 observations, and those players who never missed a game in the time period, 34 players and 84 observations. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Wooldridge's (1999) quasimaximum likelihood approach. Elasticities in square brackets and semi-elasticities in curly brackets, calculated at the means of the independent variables. Poisson DV indicates the Poisson regression using player dummy variables to control for fixed effects. Conditional fixed effects Poisson sample size is smaller due to omitting players with only one year of data, 83 observations, and those players who never missed a game in the time period, 34 players and 84 observations. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Arellano and Bond (1991) tests of first and second order serial correlation. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Contract is equal to one if the player has an active contract the following season and zero otherwise. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
